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Abstract
Flight safety depends on maintenance; however, poor maintenance is a major factor in
many aviation mishaps. This is due to the fact that some maintenance activities are carried out
improperly or are overlooked as a result of human error. Although maintenance staff are
accountable and responsible for their actions, it is important to acknowledge that maintenance
mistakes are a visible sign of deeper organizational issues. Therefore, adequate solutions to
maintenance issues must consider organizational influences. Despite efforts reduce the accident
rate within Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), the RSAF suffers from an increasing trend in
mishaps attributed to maintenance. Safety data was subsequently analyzed to gain an
understanding of the problem nature and to discover trends within the data. Additionally, the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was used to investigate previous
accidents reports in an attempt to discover the root causes behind the accidents. HFACS was
applied to 16 maintenance-related accidents to capture the nature of and connections among
latent conditions and active failures, as well as uncover the underlying causes to the accidents.
Twelve-hour shifts, fatigue, shift handover documentation & recordkeeping, and management
response to maintenance issues were among the underlying causes discovered in this research.
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ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS OF RSAF MAINTENANCE-RELATED FLIGHT SAFETY MISHAPS

I. Introduction

Military aviation accidents are considered very costly accidents, not only in terms of loss
of lives and property, but they may also cause the nation to lose a unique defense weapon that
may threaten its military capability and weaken its political position. From this point of view,
the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) lost two pilots and five fighter aircraft in 2021. The deceased
are irreplaceable, and lost aircraft could be irreplaceable for the RSAF as well. Therefore, this
research attempts to shed light on the reasons that led to the current aviation safety situation
within the RSAF.

Background and Significance of Study
According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (2022), safety is defined as
“the condition in which, through a continuous process of hazard identification and risk
management, the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at
or below, an acceptable level.” The field of aviation is a field full of hazards; whether these
hazards affect humans or equipment, they are mostly serious in nature and expensive in dollar
value. That is the reason why attention to safety within the aviation industry must be a concern
for everyone involved (Winter, 2001).
In the last 50 years, the safety of air travel has dramatically increased in the United
States. Aircraft are more dependable, navigation systems are upgraded, and flights operate with
more detailed and up-to-date weather reports thanks to the collaborative efforts of manufacturers,
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air carriers, government agencies, and many others. Pilots are also highly trained with the
assistance of incredibly advanced flight simulators (Wells, 2006).
Ancel et al. (2014) discussed how learning from past accidents is the fundamental
strategy for enhancing safety and preventing new accidents. In Cincinnati for instance, an Air
Canada DC-9 disaster led to the installation of smoke alarms and floor-level lights. Lessons from
a Delta L-1011 tragedy in Dallas led to modifications in pilot training and flying protocols meant
to prevent wind shear. Lessons acquired from a US Air Fokker 28 disaster in New York led to
changes in deicing and anti-icing methods for aircraft. Because of the lessons acquired from the
Aloha B-737 tragedy in Hawaii, testing and inspection methods for structural fatigue and
corrosion were modified (Ancel et al., 2014).
It is not as easy as it would seem to investigate the reasons behind accidents. Accidents
are usually the result of a series of events some of which may be regarded as causes (Reason,
2000). The possible safety issues that are highlighted might vary depending on how these multicause events are perceived. Imagine a scenario where an aircraft loses one of its two hydraulic
reservoirs just as it is about to take off. The crew must accurately diagnose the issue and respond
swiftly and precisely in order to prevent an accident, even though modern passenger aircraft are
built to experience hydraulic failure and still actually fly for a limited period of time. A crash
might occur if the crew pauses or makes even a little error. If the aircraft did crash, the pilot's
fault is likely to be the cause. However, it might also be attributable to system failures, as the
pilot would not have been put in such a challenging scenario if the system had not failed.
Traditional safety programs concentrate on the final moment at which an accident may
have been prevented in an effort to learn from safety issues that have previously contributed to
fatal crashes and major mishaps. Such a strategy always highlights the pilot or the maintainer. It
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is a legitimate strategy that might help advance pilot training and maintenance programs.
However, there is another, equally legitimate method that emphasizes the question of what set
off the chain of events that led to the disaster. Aviation safety professionals must consider both
strategies to stop the series of events from beginning and ways to stop a sequence that has
already started from ending in an accident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000).
Aviation safety is a topic that has received a great deal of attention on a global level, and
this is evident in the noticeable decrease in the number of annual global aviation accidents, as
shown in Figure 1. However, contrary to the global trend, Figure 2 shows that the number of
aviation accidents appears to be increasing in Saudi Arabia. There were six accidents in 2021,
while there were four accidents in 2019 and one accident in 2013 (International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2022).

Figure 1. Global Number of Accidents per Year (ICAO, 2022)
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Figure 2. Saudi Arabia Civil Aviation Accidents per Year (ICAO, 2022)

Looking into military aviation, the U.S. Air Force accident rate witnessed a noticeable
improvement over the years since the 1950s where the rate of accidents dropped dramatically, as
shown in Figure 3. This may be seen from the fact that, on average, there were 32.6 mishaps
throughout the 1950s (excluding mishaps in battle). During the 1970s, that rate was 6.8 mishaps
for every 100,000 flights, and between 2010 and 2018, it was less than two mishaps (Light,
Hamilton & Pfeifer, 2019).

4

Figure 3. U.S. Air Force Fighter Aircraft Accident Rate (Light & Pfeifer, 2019)

In the RSAF, data for the year 2021 indicated a 13.1% increase in the rate of aviation
accidents from the year 2020 (RSAF, 2021). There were 52 flight mishaps in 2021 (RSAF
Safety Directorate, 2021). According to the annual RSAF Aviation Safety Bulletin, this is an
alarming indicator (RSAF, 2021). As previously stated, the RSAF has lost two pilots and five
fighter aircraft due to these flight mishaps. As seen in Figure 4, the concluded accident causes
were attributed to many factors for example, maintenance error, material failure, aircrew error,
and undetermined/miscellaneous. After investigations, it was found that maintenance is
responsible for 61% of the total accidents. This is a serious percentage; however, it can be seen
as an opportunity for improvement and development since any success towards improving
maintenance safety will likely result in a considerable change to the overall accident rate.
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Figure 4. RSAF Accident Causes (RSAF Safety Directorate, 2021)

Flight safety mishaps are still among the current problems that the RSAF continues to
encounter. The RSAF safety directorate is making considerable educational efforts to raise the
level of safety in flying squadrons, as well as aircraft maintenance squadrons. These efforts take
the form of periodic lectures, notice boards for flyers, and holding workshops during which the
importance and danger of this field are clarified. However, each base implements its safety
program, called The Safety and Foreign Object (SAFO) Program, which is defined and
authorized by the safety directorate. However, although military aviation safety is a topic that
has been extensively researched in the literature, each organization has special circumstances
that do not necessarily apply to others. Based on this fact, no research or scientific publication
has been found that specifically explores the causes of aviation accidents in the RSAF and the
reason why the accident rate is increasing.
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It is worth noting that the RSAF accidents were classified as serious accidents (CAT 3
and 4) that led to loss of life or property or both. Looking at the data and global safety
indicators, it becomes clear that the high rate of flying accidents in the RSAF is an issue that
calls for immediate action to determine the root causes and take the appropriate action to sustain
safe operation environments (Light, Hamilton & Pfeifer, 2020).
The Royal Saudi Air Force possesses the necessary infrastructure to implement effective
safety programs, including training programs, capabilities, and the necessary manpower to
implement these programs. However, implementing an effective safety program requires
starting with knowing the roots of the problem that needs to be solved, and from there solutions
are developed that address the roots of the problem and make sure that they do not occur in the
future (Batalov, 2021).

Problem Statement
Despite the efforts made by the Royal Saudi Air Force to improve flight safety and
reduce the occurrence of accidents, the number is increasing annually. Based on data published
by the Air Force Safety Directorate, there were 46 flight accidents in 2020, including two fatal
accidents. This number continued to climb, reaching 52 accidents in 2021. Since 2017, the
number of accidents is gradually increasing, as shown in Figure 5, and that could be attributed to
many factors which will be addressed individually in the analysis portion of this thesis. This
research effort will study, analyze, and investigate why, despite all RSAF safety efforts, we
continue to have an increasing rate of accidents.
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Figure 5. RSAF F-15 Accidents rate per Year

Research and Investigative Questions
The question this research is trying to answer is: What are the root causes behind the
increasing number of maintenance-related accidents in the F-15 fleet within the RSAF? To
address this question, this research will attempt to answer the following investigative questions.
1. What do maintenance-related accidents in the RSAF have in common?
2. What factors that led to the increasing violations and the unsafe maintainer act?
3. Is maintenance the only cause for maintenance-related accidents?

Methodology
This research is based on an analysis of archival data received from the Maintenance
Data Analysis at the F-15 Maintenance Squadron at King Khalid Air Base and data from the
Safety Directorate at the Royal Saudi Air Force Command. The data was extracted from the
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reports of the accident investigation committees to represent a dataset that can be better
analyzed. An Exploratory Data Analysis was performed to show any trends and build a general
understanding of the data. Additionally, the incidents were studied by applying the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework to each maintenance-related
accident.

Assumptions and Limitations
The analysis in this research is based on data collected from the RSAF HQ Safety
Directorate records. It is assumed that the data is generated accurately and the conclusions of
investigation committees were correct. After reviewing the causes of accidents attributed to
aircrews, training was not a factor and since access to aircrew training records was not possible,
it is assumed that all aircrews received the appropriate level of training.

Thesis Organization
To illustrate the gap in knowledge, more in-depth literature review of related fields such
as Human Factors in aviation, HFACS framework, Organizational Culture, and the process of
accident investigations in aviation will be reviewed in Chapter II. Chapter III discusses the
methodology of the research and introduces the chosen tools and analysis methods. Findings and
results will be discussed in Chapter IV, which is followed by a general discussion of the findings
and improvement proposals for related maintenance processes in Chapter V.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter reviews literature related to the research question, with emphasis on four
topics. The first topic reviewed is the Human Factors and Classification System (HFACS) to
show how it was developed and how it works. The second topic discusses the organizational
culture and how it could be a factor affecting the research question. Moving on, the third topic is
human error in aviation and how it impacts aircraft maintenance workers. In this topic, some
human factors theories are discussed to better understand this field and formulate a plan to
approach the research question. Finally, Managing the Risk of Maintenance Error will be
reviewed to illustrate the knowledge gap between what is in the literature and what is being
followed in the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF).

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
Accidents in complex systems happen as a result of the buildup of several conditions and
failures. According to the renowned model shown in Figure 6, which was created by Reason
(2009) using the Swiss cheese analogy, several contributors must line up for any undesirable
outcomes to happen. Humans are prone to make errors by their very nature. This is represented
in the holes in the cheese slices. The cheese slices represent the imperfect system barriers which
are supposed to stop errors that cause the undesirable outcomes (Reason, 2009). The Swiss
cheese model is one way to look at how human error begins. It explains how an accident could
happen and how accidents are often not coincidental or the result of an error committed by the
last worker, but rather are the result of malfunctions in different levels of the system (Reason,
2009).
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Figure 6. Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 2009)

In 70-80% percent of all civilian and military aircraft accidents, human error was a
contributor. However, the majority of accident reporting processes are not created using a
theoretical model of human error. Because of this, it is difficult to identify intervention
techniques because the majority of accident records are not suitable for a conventional human
error examination. A generic framework for human error is needed so that new investigation
techniques may be developed and accident datasets can be reorganized. In reality, a thorough
system for Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has been created to
address these requirements (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000).
Wiegmann and Shappell (2000) were the first to employ HFACS based on Reason's
Swiss Cheese model for the study of aircraft accidents. A hierarchical structure may be used to
investigate accident occurrences using this broad human error analysis approach. This approach
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makes it feasible to detail the key active and latent failures as well as investigate the influence of
human factors on accidents. The most significant characteristic that sets HFACS apart from
previous accident analysis techniques is its thorough taxonomy for the investigation of
organizational and human components. In difficult situations like accidents, this taxonomy
makes it simple and precise to separate organizational and human factors. Following are the
main components and causal categories for the HFACS framework.
Unsafe Acts
According to the HFACS, the unsafe acts of operators/workers can be divided into the
two categories shown in Figure 7. An unsafe act can be simply an error or an honest mistake
which we are subjected to at all times or it could be a violation which is a willful disregard for
rules and regulations which operators/workers willingly sometimes do. However, separating
mistakes from violations does not offer the degree of detail needed for the majority of accident
investigations. As in other places (Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1982), the categories of errors and
violations were broadened to cover three fundamental error kinds (decision-based, skill-based,
and perceptual) and two types of violations (routine and exceptional).

Figure 7. Categories of Unsafe Acts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000)
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Errors are those actions committed by humans not knowing they are committing an error
at that time. These types of errors are further divided into three categories. They can be decision
error, skill-based error, or a perceptual error. However, these errors share a very important
aspect which is that these errors were committed with the best intentions in mind. It could also
be either the direct cause of an accident or a contributing factor to a cause of an accident
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). The following paragraph describes each error and how it came
to existence.
Decision errors are the first type of errors; they involve the intentional action that goes as
planned but the strategy turns out to be insufficient or improper for the circumstance. Although
having "the best intentions," these unsafe actions are the result of people who either lacked the
necessary information or made poor decisions. Skill-based behaviors are especially prone to
cognition and memory failures. The breakdown of visual scan patterns, task fixation,
accidentally activating controls, and the improper sequencing of stages in a method are just a few
examples of the many skill-based mistakes that attention lapses have been connected to
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). Perceptual errors are those errors connected to our human
senses. For example, visual illusions and spatial disorientation are examples of perceptual errors.
Additionally, perceptual errors can arise when pilots incorrectly estimate the aircraft's position,
orientation, or velocity.
Violations signify a deliberate disobedience for the laws and guidelines governing safe
flight. Fortunately, because they typically result in fatalities, they happen far less frequently
(Shappell et al., 1999b). The first type of violation, known as the “common violation,” is
typically overlooked by the government (Reason, 1990). Consider someone who often exceeds
the posted speed limit by 7 to 12 mph. Although the driver is undoubtedly in violation of the

13

laws, many other people also act in this way. Furthermore, those who go 66 mph in a zone
designated for 55 mph usually do so. In other words, they "regularly" go over the speed limit. If
a regular violation is discovered, the investigator must go higher up the managerial hierarchy to
find the people in positions of power who are not upholding the law (Reason, 2000).
Next are the exceptional violations, which can be defined as a clear departure from
authority; they represent clearly breaking the norm which is not accepted in the public opinion or
the government and is not categorized as being within the usual limits (Reason, 1990). An
example of the exceptional violation is going 120 mph in a 55 mph highway. These violations
are particularly difficult to deal with because they are unpredictable and do not represent the
individual’s typical behavior. In addition, people often have nothing to say when questioned to
defend their reckless behavior when faced with the facts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000).
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
The unsafe acts of workers account for more than 80% of all accident causes in aviation
(Reason, 2000). Understanding why and who caused the accident is essential but it is not what
an accident investigator should only be looking for. Instead, an organization should identify the
systemic or underlying reasons of an occurrence, as opposed to the obvious or immediate ones,
by doing a root cause analysis. An issue's symptom may be eliminated by addressing merely its
immediate source, but the problem is not resolved. Dealing with only what caused the accident
is similar to taking fever medication without knowing and treating what caused that fever in the
first place. Some organizations do not investigate the root causes of accidents. The
preconditions of unsafe acts are divided into the two main categories shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Pre-conditions for Unsafe Acts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000)

Being psychologically prepared is important in almost any activity, but perhaps more so
in aviation. Situational awareness loss, task obsession, interruption, and mental exhaustion
brought on by lack of sleep or other pressures are among the key examples. Personality
characteristics and harmful attitudes like arrogance, complacency, and improper motivation can
be included in this class. Understandably, the risk that an error will be committed increases if a
person is mentally exhausted for any reason. Similar to this, ego and other harmful traits like
arrogance and recklessness will affect the probability that a mistake will be committed.
The presence of negative mental states earlier in the causal chain of events must thus be
considered in any framework of human error analysis (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000).
Adverse physiological states refer to any physical or medical issues that make it difficult
to perform an operation safely. Visual limitations, physical exhaustion spatial disorientation,
physical exhaustion, and the wide range of pharmacological and medical disorders that are
known to impair performance are all of particular importance to aviation.
Physical/Mental limitations specifically covers situations where the task requirements are
more than what the person in charge is capable of. Examples include a maintenance worker
replacing a heavy part without the necessary tools or a pilot who does not have the physical
15

capacity to operate during a high G maneuver. Pushing the limits on the physical and mental
limits of individuals is more likely to result in an error (Reason, 2000).
For instances of ineffective staff coordination, the category of crew resource
mismanagement was introduced. This refers to coordination between and among aircraft, air
traffic control and maintenance in the aviation domain. It is simple to picture a situation in
which a lack of crew cooperation resulted in uncertainty and faulty decision-making in the
cockpit which then resulted in a disaster. In practice, there are several instances of ineffective
crew communication in aviation disaster records (Reason, 2009).
Unsafe Supervision
As shown in Figure 9, inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to
correct problem, and supervisory violations are the four forms of unsafe supervision that was
discussed in the HFACS framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). The supervisor is
responsible for providing direction, opportunity for training, mentoring, and motivation, as well
as serving as a good example. However, it does not always happen. Any successful company
requires dependable expert monitoring and leadership

Figure 9. Unsafe Supervision (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000)
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While giving people the freedom to make decisions and work independently is
unquestionably important, it does not absolve the manager of responsibility. Many of the errors
that have snuck into the cockpit were found to be caused by a lack of supervision and direction
(Reason, 2000). As a result, the role supervision plays in the development of human mistakes
must be considered in any complete analysis of accident-causing elements.
Occasionally, the operating pace and/or the management of aircrew puts people in an
intolerable danger, jeopardizes crew rest, and eventually has a negative impact on performance.
During exceptional circumstances, leadership might be forced to enforce some decisions which
normally will not be enforced. For example, during an emergency, leadership might order an
aircrew to fly during their crew rest time.
Failing to Correct Problem refers to situations in which supervision is "aware" of
problems with employees, training, equipment, or other associated safety areas, yet the problems
are nonetheless allowed to continue unchecked and the problem is left uncorrected. However,
unsafe environments and rule-breaking results when inappropriate behavior is not constantly
corrected or penalized.
Supervisory violations refer to situations where supervisors willfully violate existing
rules and procedures. Supervisors have been seen to go against the rules when managing their
assets; however, this is debatably rare. For instance, there have been instances where people
have been given permission to carry out a duty without the necessary training or authorization. It
is also possible to argue that disregarding existing laws and regulations or abusing power are
violations at the supervisory level.
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Organizational Influences
Upper-level management's poor judgments have a direct impact on supervision
procedures, worker conditions, and behaviors. Consequently, safety experts frequently miss
these organizational mistakes since there is not a defined foundation from which to look into
them. The most unknown underlying failures typically include problems that relate to resource
management, organizational climate, and operational processes as shown in Figure 10
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). However, to make it easier for committees to investigate
organizational influences, the committees should be formed to have independent, expert, and
unbiased members.

Figure 10. Organizational Influences (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000)

Resource Management covers the area of corporate-level decision-making with relation
to the distribution and upkeep of organizational assets including manpower, financial assets,
machinery and buildings. Serious cost-cutting may also restrict financing for new equipment
purchases or result in the purchase of equipment that is not optimum or properly built for the
desired operations. Poorly maintained workplaces and equipment, as well as the neglect of
current equipment's recognized design problems, are further consequences that cascade down.
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As a result, untrained, less-skilled workers are forced to service outdated, subpar aircraft under
less than ideal circumstances and time constraints.
Organizational Climate alludes to the environment at work within the company. The
organizational structure is represented in the chain of command, the division of labor, the
communication patterns, and the legal accountability for actions. Within an organization,
coordination and communication are essential. Organizational safety definitely suffers and
accidents occur when leaders and staff are not in communication or when no one is sure who is
in control (Muchinsky & Howes, 1997). An example of the influence of the organization climate
over the performance of workers is whenever it tolerates bad work behaviors, good workers, for
many reasons, are likely to stop being good and follow the footsteps of everyone else.
Operational processes refer to the organization’s rules and regulations that control day-today operations inside an organization. Time pressure, formal means of communication between
employees and management, shift patterns, and reward systems are some of the examples that
fall under this category.

Organizational Culture
What is an organization’s culture? Intuitively, one might assume the term is referring to
the set of values and behaviors that members of an organization have normalized and which have
become the norms. “It is how we do things around here” regardless of whether it is the wrong or
the right thing to do. Culture is both an ever-present dynamic phenomena that is continually
generated by our interactions with others and molded by leadership conduct, as well as a
collection of routines, structures, rules, and standards that direct and control behavior (Smith,
2003). Organizational culture is a term that refers to the prevailing and recognized atmosphere
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among the employees of the organization, and it is one of the characteristics that distinguish
organizations from each other (Light, Hamilton & Pfeifer, 2019). An interesting feature of
culture as a concept is how it alerts us to things that are profound in their effects, yet unseen. We
can observe the resulting behavior, but frequently we are unable to observe the underlying causes
that give rise to certain patterns of behavior. Just as our personality and character shape and
limit our conduct though, so too can common norms held by members of a group shape and limit
the behavior of those members.
Managers strive to influence the behavior of their employees, but they frequently run
across an employee’s reaction that seems like a fear of change which is often irrational. It is
common to see organizations with several departments that appear more concerned with arguing
with each other than getting the work done. It can be observed that there are issues with group
members' interactions and conflicts which should not exist between logical people.
Understanding the complexity of culture will allow us to understand why individuals or
organizations can be so different, as well as why it can be difficult to change them. We should
be less confused, annoyed, and worried when we encounter unusual and somewhat irrational
conduct among employees and management. Even more crucially, a deeper understanding of
culture will help us better comprehend who we are as individuals, the factors that shape who we
are, the groups with which we identify, and the groups to which we want to belong (Smith,
2003).
When existing beliefs and norms might contribute to organizational failure, change is
essential for an organization's existence (Karube, Numagami & Kato, 2009). Organizational
transformation is the practice of implementing behavioral science-based tactics to adjust at work
and increase performance via changing employee behavior (Bale, 2008). Piderit (2000)
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developed the force-field theory by advancing Lewin's concept of resistance as "a restraining
force acting in the direction of sustaining the status quo" (Lewin, 1947). Employee attitudes,
cognitive and emotional processes, and managerial behavior are all blamed for resistance
(Smollan 2009). According to Piderit (2000), resistance might take the form of deliberate
actions of disobedience, a certain sort of inactivity, or even a readiness to lie to officials. Since
meaning for people exists at the subjective level, it is necessary to develop communication
tactics at that level (Mouton, Just & Gabrielsen, 2012).
Lean and Action Research are two examples of significant context-driven actions that
may help persuade the more hesitant workers to adopt change and willingly correct their own
behavior. Only when dissonance is clearly understood and handled can the fight for consistency
between declared and practiced values be won. Otherwise, the organization would experience
the negative impacts of its unconscious behaviors and unintentionally degrade. What is
important to realize is that previous behaviors of individuals and groups can subtly undermine an
organization's viability and that better approaches can be found in the study of topics like
psychology, lean manufacturing, action research, and resistance to change (Danese, Manfè &
Romano, 2017).
In conclusion, culture may be thought of as the collective knowledge that members of a
group have acquired over time. This knowledge includes mental, affective, and behavioral
aspects of the group members' overall psychological functioning. In order for this type of shared
learning to take place, there must be a record of prior shared experiences, which entails some
degree of membership stability. With this stability and a common past, the numerous shared
parts will ultimately coalesce into patterns that may be referred to as a culture as a result of
human desire for consistency, stability, and meaning.
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Human Factors
Human error is subjective to every human. However, the negative consequences of
human failure or human error tend to be common. Human error builds on one’s weaknesses and
cognitive disabilities, which leads to an adverse reaction or outcome. In the case of aircraft,
human error may be the most significant factor when it comes to aircraft accidents, aircraft
breakdowns, aircraft dysfunctionalities, etc. “Reason’s use of learning and performance
mechanisms to explain errors is an exciting demonstration of the power of cognitive theory. It is
true to his thesis that errors arise out of normally adaptive psychological processes”
(Kirschenbaum, 1990). Kirschenbaum (1990) describes the mechanisms and backing of human
cognitive behavior that lead to making errors. Kirschenbaum (1990) highlights that the
performance mechanisms have a strong bearing on the magnitude of the error; therefore, it will
not be an exaggeration to say that performance mechanisms and human error have a direct
relationship.
In terms of the aircraft industry, human error has a more specified definition. “According
to the definition, the human factor is an unintentional error in the work which results in
immediate damage of the system or it may be a hidden error which represents a potential danger
for the technical airworthiness of the aircraft” (Virovac, 2017). Here, Virovac (2017) provides
an immaculate description of the word ‘human error’ with respect to aircraft maintenance.
Virovac (2017) simply builds on the relationship of human error being a large reason enough to
cause potential danger to the technicality and functionality of the aircraft. “The modern era of
aviation has witnessed an ironic reversal of sorts. It now appears to some that the aircrew
themselves are deadlier than the aircraft they fly” (Mason, 1993; cited in Murray, 1997). In fact,
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estimates in the literature indicate that “between 70 and 80 percent of aviation accidents can be
attributed, at least in part, to human error” (Shappel, 2000).
Now that we have established the true meaning of the word human error, we can study
in-depth the human errors in aircraft maintenance. For starters, we will talk about the different
types of accidents that occur due to human error. At times, the aircraft is flown towards the
ground without any explainable or traceable reasons. This circumstance tends to create a huge
safety hazard and a cause of concern for all the people directly involved. For instance, Shappell
(2001) states, “Most agree that Controlled Flight into Terrain CFIT is an unintentional collision
with terrain occurs when an airworthy aircraft, under the control of a pilot, is flown into terrain
(water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending
disaster.” Here, Shappell (2001) highlights that such accidents are usually attributed to the lack
of awareness on the part of the pilot. At times, these attributes or lack of awareness could be
attached to personal mental or phycological disorders. Shappell (2001) states that a stressful and
dysfunctional mind is more likely to either zone out or make a mistake due to the inability to
focus.
Adding to the causes, we can also shed light on unsafe procedures and faulty process
lines. Even though organizations have large and efficient inspection teams, there is still a chance
that some errors or faults could have been ignored or overlooked before final execution. Anu
(2016) sheds light on it by exclaiming, “Traditional fault-based requirements inspection
techniques (like Fault Checklist inspection) focus inspectors’ attention on a different type of
faults (e.g., incorrect or incomplete or ambiguous requirements). Even a faithful application of
validated fault-based techniques does not help inspectors in finding all faults.” Anu (2016)
highlights how much of a deterrent it is to the safety of all stakeholders regardless of how many

23

inspection units are set up. Adding to this, Anu (2016) also highlights that since many of the
faults are not identified earlier, they pose greater costs when they are discovered later. Anu
(2016) asserts that most of the budget and time of the organization and the members of the
organization respectively is spent on fixing the failures that could have been prevented in the
first place.
Another underlying reason for increased human errors is frequent maintenance. The
aviation and aircraft industry call for drastic and frequent maintenance. If, however, the
maintenance is influenced by commercial backings, it is more likely to have a detrimental effect
on the smooth and efficient operations of the organization. Commercially backed maintenance
requires certain aircraft equipment to stay out of use, which ultimately results in lower
productivity and efficiency. This tends to cause delays in operations which serve as an obstacle
to the reduction in human error (Pennie, 2007).
In another instance, Hobbs (2008) initially presented the notion of how maintenance
tends to give rise to human failure and human error. This is mainly attributable to the state
where the machinery or equipment cannot be used due to them undergoing the maintenance
process. In such situations, due to lack of time and poor productivity, there is a greater chance of
a human error occurring. However, Hobbs (2008) later builds on the idea of power outages and
maintenance quality as the major contributing factors. Hobbs (2008) builds on his argument,
“Maintenance errors not only pose a threat to flight safety, but can also impose significant
financial costs through delays, cancellations, diversions, and other schedule disruptions.”
Human Error Reduction in The Aviation Industry. Moving further, now we will
attempt to deeply look for and analyze reasons that result in a greater chance of a human error
occurring in the aircraft industry and maintenance; we can propose a series of solutions that have
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proved to be effective in the past to help resolve the issue. For example, Cacciabue (2004)
states, “When performing a process of design or assessment of a Human Machine System HMS,
it is essential that the specific area of application of the system under study is well delineated.
This differs from the point of view on identification of the goals of the system of thought; there
are strong links between these two standpoints. In practice, four areas of application must be
considered, namely, Design, Training, Safety Assessment, and Accident Investigation.”
Cacciabue (2004) here highlights a four-factor framework that could be put into effect as a
promising solution to the problem at hand. The first step includes the assurance of an accurate
design for aircraft equipment and materials. The design and structure of the aircraft equipment
should be as such that it ensures smooth and perfect running without limited risks of breaking
down. The second step includes proactive training. Training is integral to smooth operations in
such a setting. Training allows workers to thoroughly know and understand how to operate
aircraft equipment and tools. If a worker fails to properly operate aircraft equipment, there could
be a greater risk of associated human error, which may eventually lead to adverse consequences.
The third most important level from the four-factor framework is the safety assessment.
The safety assessment includes conducting dry runs, quality assurance, keeping a check and
balance on every step, and ensuring that every tool and equipment is used correctly in a safe
manner. Safety assessments allow management to discover any risks associated with aircraft
equipment or tools before final execution and use of the product. This helps the managers
provide solutions to it beforehand without running large risks. Lastly, another very essential
factor is the accident investigation. Human error might definitely lead to accidents, although the
magnitude of the accidents may differ. Therefore, to prevent such mistakes in the future and to
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assess the core reason for the cause of the accident, an effective and thorough investigation
becomes a requirement.
In addition to this, restricting the aviation environment coupled with thorough and
systematic inspection is another approach suggested by researchers to reduce errors associated
with accidents. Latorella (2000) highlights, “Aviation maintenance and inspection tasks occur
within the larger context of organizational and physical environmental factors. A system model
of aviation maintenance and inspection defines four interacting components in this system
(operators, equipment, documentation, and task) and suggests that these components interact
over time as well as within both physical and social, or organizational, environments.” Latorella
(2000) here highlights that to reduce human error significantly and permanently, it is necessary
to restructure the organization to complement a more efficient task force system. As Latorella
(2000) has stated already, an effective workplace includes four components: operators,
equipment, documentation, and task.
These four factors combine to form the baseline for the aircraft industry. Efficiently
executing each of the four components will help achieve a vivid reduction in accidents caused by
human errors. Again, operators include all the processes that involve the usage and execution of
aircraft equipment and tools. The equipment factor includes the design, processing, and
functionality of each aircraft. This ensures that the equipment works properly and fulfills its
desired purposes and tasks. The third and fourth factors are interlinked with each other.
Documentation and tasks include efficient and effective recording and assigning of tasks,
primarily to keep a check and balance on each staff member, pilot, worker, etc. The last and
most important factor is inspection. The author states that inspection is very important since it
has characteristics that are synonymous with the theory of total quality assurance and
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management. Quality assurance techniques ensure every individual in the organization takes
inspection and effective functionality as their primary responsibility.
In another instance, the European aircraft maintenance organization has managed to
establish a safety program to create a more cohesive environment in an attempt to reduce human
error and the intense consequences of it. This safety program is called the maintenance action
safety program. There are a variety of underlying principles backing the solutions it has
proposed. Not only does the safety action program suggest a range of solutions, but it also
questions and attempts to break the shackles of rigid organizational structures and policies. For
instance, Virovac (2017) states the following:
Maintenance Safety Action Program has been developed as tools for the
prevention and reduction of errors in aircraft maintenance caused by an
unintentional error of technical personnel. The program proposes the
participation of all the immediate stakeholders included in the process of aircraft
operation and maintenance.
The basic characteristics of the program include technical personnel must
continuously work on the improvement of the quality of work, the culture of
reporting errors without punishing the personnel has been developed; when
people are punished, the errors are kept hidden, reporting in case that employees
have any recommendation for improvement of the work process in the way to
prevent possible future error, introduction of the program into an organization for
aircraft maintenance means fewer errors in maintenance, which results in an
increase of safety and reduction of costs.
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The maintenance safety action program is a multi-dimensional program since it includes possibly
all the members and stakeholders of the aircraft maintenance industry. The first factor, where
the program states that every individual must work on the improvement of their work, is simply
the role every member of the staff must play when a quality control and quality assurance
department is setup. Every individual must view reducing human error and quality as their
primary responsibility through every task. The second factor attempts to question the rigidity in
our conventional organizational structures. Usually, when a worker accidentally makes an error,
the staff member is punished. Therefore, in such circumstances, it is unlikely that a staff
member will report any operational or technical issue. Once this perception is changed into
managers being more cohesive and worker-friendly, it is more likely that workers will report
significant issues; this reduces the chance of intense adverse consequences of human error as it
gives room to managers to improve or prevent such a situation from occurring.
Additionally, the third factor also attempts to question the otherwise autocratic nature of
the aviation industry. A worker-friendly environment is more likely to welcome innovative
solutions to reduce human error. Therefore, the idea behind this is to perpetuate a more
democratic approach towards employees, thereby reducing the power distance between managers
and employees. Lastly, the maintenance action safety program also brings in the need for
training and development for safety measures, precautionary measures, etc., all with respect to
the aviation industry.
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Managing the Risk of Maintenance Error
How to motivate the reporting of maintenance issues that could otherwise go unreported
to management is a key challenge for maintenance organizations. Quick access recorders,
cockpit voice recorders, and flight data recorders, in addition to passengers and the general
public, can be used to constantly monitor the operations of pilots. However, despite the
significant paperwork that goes along with maintenance, the day-to-day activities of technicians
may be less noticeable to management than the activity of pilots.
Error Management refers to the process of analyzing all available data to identify the root
causes of errors and then taking the necessary steps, such as altering rules, regulations, and
training, to both prevent errors from happening in the first place and to decrease the impact of
those that happen (Andrei, 2011). The phrase quality management system (QMS) first
originated in the airlines industry in the 1960s, laying the groundwork for occupational health
and Safety Management Systems SMS (Stolzer, Goglia, and Stolzer, 2015).
The SMS is a performance-based approach to safety which delivers benefits because it
puts more emphasis on obtaining the intended result than it does on whether or not an entity is in
compliance. It is crucial to remember, however, that the application of a safety performance
strategy is participatory because it calls for aviation industry to make a concerted effort to design
appropriate methods to accomplish the desired objectives and, with regard to entities, to analyze
almost every approach (ICAO, 2018).
Implementing safety management has several advantages, some of which are as follows:
improved safety culture; a documented, methodical procedure to guarantee safety; a better
comprehension of the links and interactions linked to safety; improved early warning of safety
risks; and cost reduction (ICAO, 2018).
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III. Methodology

This chapter explains the methodology and the tools used for the analysis. The goal is to
answer the research question through exploring and visually representing the data and the
application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). This chapter
will also show the method used for applying the HFACS to the accidents’ reports. However,
there were some potential accidents causal investigations frameworks to consider: Accimap,
STAMP, and HFACS. Despite the fact that Accimap and STAMP are probably more thorough
in terms of the contributing factors they discover, the HFACS framework is more reliable since it
is taxonomic and is more effective in analyzing various case study scenarios (Salmon,
Cornelissen & Trotter, 2012).

The Data
Two sources of archival data were used in this research. Firstly, data was obtained from
the Maintenance Data Analysis department of the F-15 Maintenance Squadron at King Khalid
Air Base. Secondly, data was obtained from the Safety Directorate at the Royal Saudi Air Force
Command. The data contains records for 52 aircraft accidents reports which contains aircraft
type, aircraft total hours, system failure, prior system failure, pilot rank, technician level, and the
main cause of the accident.

Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)
The data was received in the form of reports of the accident investigation committees, as
well as in the form of incidents safety reports. Work has been done to extract the data from the
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reports so the data can be analyzed. The data was cleaned after the extraction process during
which the data source was contacted to clarify or provide more data whenever necessary.
Accidents reports that had missing data were excluded from the analysis and 52 accident reports
were analyzed. The software used was JMP® Pro 15.0.0 and Microsoft Excel for the purpose of
EDA. JMP® Pro 15.0.0 and Microsoft Excel were used simultaneously to visually represent the
data in a graphical representations to better understand, identify patterns, and discover trends
within the data.

HFACS Application
The application of HFACS requires thorough investigation of the accidents reports to
identify the potential errors that might have caused or contributed to the cause of the accident.
This requires access to detailed information surrounding the accident. The 16 maintenancerelated accidents produced 33 causes for additional analyses. Each of these causes was then
coded individually using the HFACS framework. The causes acknowledged by the accident
committees were considered. However, no new causes were formed during the coding process.
The next step in the HFACS application is to code/categorize the errors to fall into one or more
levels of the framework shown in Table 1. Table 3 shows the HFACS coding method. Each
accident cause was given a code across the different levels of HFACS: management influences
(M), Maintainer Conditions (T), Working Conditions (W), and Maintainer Acts and Violations
(V). However, the HFACS framework is flexible on how many levels are needed to address the
organization’s individual needs and the codes can be changed as long as they follow the general
frameworks methodology.
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Table 1. HFACS Coding Process

Each accident report was reviewed to gather the necessary information to select the
appropriate level of HFACS which had an input on the overall accident cause. According to
HFACS, it is possible to have more than one contributing cause or, on ratre occasions, just the
main cause. For example, accident report number 13 was coded for two violation codes (V1 and
V8). The reason for this coding is that the maintainer relied on experience (Attention/Memory
V1) and knowingly serviced tires with the wrong pressure gauge (Flagrant V8), which resulted in
a mishap during take-off.
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Table 2. HFACS Application to Accidents Reports
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The Accidents Investigation Committee report shown in Table 2 was randomly selected
from the available data. Based on the available information within the report and looking at the
details that led to the accident, we can apply the HFACS framework in order to know what
caused the accident (Unsafe Act) and what other factors led to this event (preconditions to the
unsafe act, unsafe supervision and organizational influence), not just the main cause. A total of
16 maintenance related accident reports were analyzed following a similar process.
Subsequently, we can answer the research question: What are the root causes behind the
increasing number of maintenance-related accidents in the F-15 fleet within the RSAF?
Table 3. Summary of Key Results in an Accident Investigation Committee Report
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IV. Results and Findings

This chapter presents two types of analysis techniques, Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)
of the data discussed in Chapter III and an application of the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS) which is an accident casual investigation framework. The
analysis will only be presented with no attempt to make impressions of these analyses. The
inferences portion is reserved for Chapter V.

Data Analysis
After the data has been cleaned, rearranged and analyzed, the results of the analysis are
presented in this section.
Prior System Failure
It is clear from this analysis that one of the causes of accidents is improper maintenance
as more than a third of the accidents were related to previous failures that could have been
properly repaired but for some reason were not. Figure 12 shows that 38% of the accidents, a
total of 19 accidents, had a malfunction in the same system that caused the accident on recent
flights. However, it is possible that the prior failure is not directly related to what actually
caused the accident. In other words, if maintenance had performed the right maintenance, a third
of the RSAF F-15 fleet maintenance-related mishaps could have more likely been avoided.
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Similarly, 4 of the 19 accidents which had a prior failure were attributed to material failure and
maintenance should have captured and dealt with these errors right from the first occurrence.

Figure 11. Prior System Failure

Total Aircrew-Related Accidents vs. Pilot Rank
It was noted from the data that the rank of 2nd Lieutenant was the rank that had the most
accidents classified as an air crew error. In second place is the rank of captain, and then the rank
of major. It should be noted that the rank of 1st lieutenant has encountered fewer accidents than
the rank of officers with more experience and seniority. However, the Lieutenant colonel was
attributed to 10% of the aircrew-related accidents, as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 12. Total Aircrew-Related Accidents vs. Pilot Rank

Intuitively, the more experience the pilot has, the less errors he/she might commit.
However, with limited understanding of how aircrew training works, there are some points worth
mentioning. In the RSAF, the rank of 2nd Lieutenant (equivalent to 1st Lieutenant in the USAF) is
the rank where pilots are allowed to fly without an instructor pilot. When pilots pass a course
known as Fighter Pilot training-003 course, they are allowed to lead a mission. 1st Lieutenant
(equivalent to 2nd Lieutenant in the USAF) is generally not yet allowed to lead the mission and
must fly with an instructor pilot. The rank of Captain and Major are considered experienced
pilots and most missions are carried out by these two ranks. However, this research did not look
into the flying hours for the pilots and the level of training they received due to the data
collection limitations mentioned in Chapter I. It is recommended to further investigate this area
to determine if there is any association between the pilot’s rank and the rate of accidents.
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Accident Cause and Technicians Level
Maintenance is determined to have contributed/caused 31 accidents out of 50.
Technician level is shown to have some association with accidents. Figure 14 shows that out of
31 accidents attributed to maintenance, level 5 technicians were attributed to have caused 22
accidents which accounts for 71% of total maintenance-related accidents.

Figure 13. Accidents and Technician Level

Technical Orders (TOs) specifically prohibit level-5 technicians from working on or
signing off any task without supervision from a senior technician. However, accident reports
clearly show that level-5 technicians are actively taking part in maintenance without the
requirement of the presence of a supervisor. Moreover, the TOs make it unquestionably clear
that each level-5 technician should be considered a trainee and must always be assigned to work
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with a supervisor to follow up and monitor his training. This is clearly a violation of the RSAF
rules by the management, trainer, and the trainee as well.
Accidents and Failure System
Representing more than 52% of the total accidents causes, Aircraft Electrical and
Avionics systems were shown to be the top contributors to all maintenance-related accidents, as
shown in Figure 15. The third category is labeled MISC; it includes causes that are not related to
a particular aircraft system, for example, aircrew procedure errors, bird strikes, etc. These causes
accounted for 24% of the total accidents. Engines, Hydraulics, and Air Plane General were the
cause for 24% of the total accidents. It is worth mentioning that although many sub-systems fall
under these systems, only the main system was selected to facilitate data analysis. However,
each accident was examined separately to ensure that there was no ambiguity in determining the
main cause of the accident, and thus the reliance on this data would be more appropriate.

Figure 14. Accident and Failure System
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HFACS Application to Maintenance-Related Accidents
The HFACS results in Figure 16 show management and supervisory influence to be a
contributing factor in all accidents. Maintainer acts are linked to 44% of the total accident,
maintainer conditions were attributed to 38%, and working conditions were responsible for 19%
of the total accidents.

Figure 15. HFACS Results

Management Influence
Looking at the management and supervisory influence and how the HFACS addresses
this level, HFACS showed inadequate supervision and uncorrected problems to be the top
contributors to this level (50%), as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 16. Management Influence

Unsafe Maintainer Acts
Errors and violations were the cause for 50% of the total accidents, as shown in Figure
18. Exceptional and Flagrant violations are said to be the cause for 31% of total accidents. It is
worth mentioning that with every violation and error, management is also held responsible under
the HFACS framework since management is expected to anticipate, prepare for, and react to
violations prior to their occurrences.
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Figure 17. Errors and Violations (Unsafe Maintainer Acts)
Maintainer Conditions
Maintainer conditions were linked to a total of 6 accidents (37.5%) Figure 19. Inadequate
assertiveness and adverse physical states were the top two contributors to this level. An example
for inadequate assertiveness is when a technician signs off a discrepancy to meet the schedule,
and an adverse physical state condition is when a technician commits an error because he/she
was overworked.
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Figure 18. Maintainer Conditions
Working Conditions
Working Conditions were linked to three accidents (19%), as shown in Figure 20. All
three events are linked to management for failure to either enforce the rules or make resources
available.

Figure 19. Working Conditions
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Discussion
Utilizing a structured and methodical error investigation system like HFACS has two
major benefits. First, it increased the efficacy of investigations. Structured systems act as
prompts or checklists to help the investigator find pertinent concerns when they are being
investigated. Second, when the system has been in operation for some time, a bank of incident
data in a format appropriate for statistical analysis becomes accessible. Applying HFACS to
accidents related to maintenance has clearly shown that management contributed to all accidents
in different ways. However, maintenance squadrons must be reassessed in terms of management
and supervision.
HFACS was able to link all accidents back to management (100% of the time) whether it
was uncorrected problems, shortage of appropriate tools, or reluctance to enforce the RSAF
rules. The number of violations within maintenance squadrons that have caused these accidents
seem to suggest that it became a culture to cut corners and bend the rules; additionally, it was
noted on one instance that a supervisor allowed it to happen.
HFACS has a unique ability to capture the root causes of an accident and not just the
unsafe act that caused it. The RSAF accidents, as well as the connections between underlying
conditions and active errors, were successfully captured by the HFACS framework. The
obtained insights offer a sound framework for the creation of viable intervention solutions. The
majority of the detected human error causal factors include aspects of insufficient supervision,
procedures, and training; communication issues on process modifications; inspection and errors
omission; and procedural breaches. These conclusions allow for the prioritization and
subsequent identification of the main failure sources.
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Some areas within the maintenance squadrons are clearly in need of a system-level
intervention. For example, record keeping, overworked technicians, resources allocations, shift
handovers, 12-hours shifts, manpower, quality control, and other areas are briefly discussed in
the next section.

Working Conditions
Reading through the investigation committees reports showed that maintainers who were
involved had complained about certain issues with the working conditions and might have
contributed to the cause of the accident. These issues are as follows.
Documentation & Recordkeeping
Documented procedures are crucial for aircraft maintenance. The FAA estimates that
between 25% and 40% of the time spent by aircraft maintenance staff is spent on maintenance
reporting ("Documentation & Recordkeeping," 2019). One of the major reasons for maintenance
issues is improper documentation. A variety of problems, including memory lapses, technical
ambiguities, and regulation breaches, can result from poor maintenance documentation
management. The major issue is not typically inaccurate information or technical mistakes when
it comes to the content of maintenance manuals, structural repair manuals, and other documents
like the minimum equipment list. Few, if any, mistakes were discovered in maintenance
manuals. However, there were other issues with the methods that were written down.
The aircraft file is mostly the only form of communication between aircrew and
maintenance technicians. In the accident reports discussed in the results chapter of this research,
maintenance technicians reported that aircrew write-ups of faults were frequently insufficient in
pinpointing the issue. However, pilots admitted that they did not really document the issue but
instead noted discrepancies on scraps of paper or verbally informed maintenance staff.
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Investigations of the accident reports revealed organizational-level issues, often including
training and certification processes, budget allocation, and widespread culture, even though
maintenance incidents typically entail mistakes committed by workers. For instance, a
maintenance infraction, like using the wrong tool, may have happened since the right tool was
not supplied, which may have been caused by equipment purchase restrictions or financial
limitations. Time constraints are among the most frequently cited justifications for maintenance
infractions, and this is itself a sign of organizational issues like budgeting, workforce shortages,
or task management. But even though technicians' activities normally uncover human factors
vulnerabilities in maintenance, these issues are typically solved at the organizational level.
Shift Handover
Numerous maintenance jobs, especially those involving heavy maintenance, cannot be
finished in a single shift. Workers who maintain aircraft regularly have to accept work-inprogress from coworkers and transfer incomplete work to a new shift. One of the most important
aspects of maintenance work is the requirement to communicate information properly and
effectively, sometimes without direct interaction. However, handovers are also a chance to
monitor work progress, discover faults, and remedy them. Shift handovers are frequently
focused on the transmission of information from the departing shift to the incoming shift. It is
advised that face-to-face handovers be done by the technicians themselves.
Fatigue
There are two primary causes of fatigue. The first is lack of sleep, and the second is how
human performance is impacted by 24-hour cycles. According to recent studies (FAA, 2016),
shift workers who undergo moderate sleep loss might have symptoms that are strikingly
comparable to those brought on by alcohol. The ability to execute numerous jobs mentally and
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physically is compromised after 18 hours of awake time. The consequences of weariness are
especially noticeable during boring duties that call for the detection of a rare issue, such as some
inspection assignments. The likelihood of maintenance mistakes seems to be higher during night
shifts. According to accident reports, maintenance personnel are more likely to make mistakes
regarding failures to carry out intentions, such as forgetfulness and perceptual mistakes, when
they are feeling sleepy.
Twelve-Hour Shifts
Maintenance shifts of 12 hours are becoming more typical. Sometimes, rather than being
forced by management, a corporation chooses to implement 12-hour shifts. When compared to
8-hour hours, 12-hour shifts have several benefits, including the ability to finish more work
during each shift and fewer job handovers between shifts. They also allow additional days off.
Workers occasionally report fewer health issues and better sleep while on a 12-hour shift pattern
than when on an 8-hour pattern, despite the fact that they are often more exhausted at the
conclusion of a 12-hour shift than at the end of an 8-hour shift (Pollock, 1988). The likelihood
of accidents or injuries will not necessarily rise if shift lengths are increased from 8 to 12 hours,
according to current studies. However, 12-hour shifts might not always be the best option. It is
crucial to assess the impact of any move to 12-hour shifts on the productivity and well-being of
employees.
Responding to Maintenance Issues
There are two ways that an organization might respond to a maintenance issue. First,
error-producing situations inside the organization can be identified and addressed in order to
reduce the likelihood of maintenance error. This often entails paying attention to fatigue
management, providing proper tooling and equipment, training on human factors, and taking

47

additional measures aimed at the human aspects connected to maintenance mistakes. Second, it
is important to recognize that a maintenance mistake is a risk that can be diminished but never
completely removed. The RSAF may learn to control the unavoidable risk of a maintenance
error in the same manner that they control other natural risks like weather.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter's goal is to use the information from the preceding chapters to address the
research questions which were asked in the first chapter. After finishing the process and
reviewing the research's findings, the investigative questions were addressed. The three questions
and their answers are presented below. A conclusion and recommendation for further research
are also included.

Answers to the Investigative Questions
This section addresses the three investigative questions. The first investigative question
was, “What do maintenance-related accidents in the RSAF have in common?” The second
investigative question was, “What factors that led to the increasing violations and the unsafe
maintainer acts?” The third investigative question was, “What factors that led to the increasing
violations and the unsafe maintainer acts?” The answers to these questions act as the foundation
for exploring the root causes for the maintenance-related accidents.
1. What do maintenance-related accidents in the RSAF have in common? The research
shows that the root cause of all maintenance-related accidents is linked back to
management in different ways. This link is in the form of something management did or
should have done.
2. What factors that led to the increasing violations and the unsafe maintainer acts? By not
enforcing the RSAF laws and regulations, and since this is linked to all unsafe
maintainer acts, management is the main factor. Maintainer conditions, organizational
culture, training, and supervision are also important factors that contributed to the
increasing maintainer violations and the unsafe acts.
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3. Is maintenance the only cause for maintenance-related accidents? No. Applying
HFACS to all accidents showed that there is system level malfunction beyond
maintenance level.

The maintenance workforce is essential to the operation of aviation; however,
maintenance errors pose a serious and ongoing danger to aviation safety. Management used to
respond to maintenance faults with punishment or dismissal since they believed them to be
nothing more than people failing to do their given jobs. Nowadays, it is well acknowledged that
maintenance slip-ups reflect the interaction of organizational, workplace, and human elements.
Managing the risk of maintenance missteps necessitates a system-level reaction, even if
maintenance specialists must still accept responsibility for their activities.
The majority of the time, a mishap's immediate conditions are signs of more serious,
underlying issues. Rarely will treating a problem's symptoms result in acceptable remedies, and
it might even make matters worse. For instance, mandating compliance with a habitually
disregarded process could be counterproductive if it is unsuitable or badly designed. We must
locate and address the underlying basic reasons, also known as root causes, of accidents if we are
to achieve long-lasting changes. We must continuously question "Why?" (as in “Why did the
behavior occur?”) to get to the organizational underlying causes of a mistake impacting human
performance. What caused risk controls to fail? Why did the underlying causes exist? "Why?"
ultimately brings us to organizational details that have significant and far-reaching effects on
safety and quality.
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Further Research Recommendation
The quality control flight (QCF) is responsible for managing quality within the F-15
maintenance squadron. That includes ensuring maintenance works, related facilities, equipment,
training, and technicians are in accordance with all procedures outlined in Royal Saudi Air Force
technical orders and procedures. For future research, it is suggested to study the feasibility of
merging the QCF with the Logistics Performance Evaluation Squadron (LPES) to eliminate the
management influence of the QCF. As a supporting argument for the future research, some of
the interesting facts and information about the current quality program at the Maintenance
Squadron at King Khalid Air Base process will be discussed in the next few sections.
Quality Control Flight
As shown in Figure 21, the QCF Commander reports directly to the Maintenance
Squadron Commander (MSC) and has horizontal association with other flight commanders and
section chiefs.

Figure 20. Maintenance Squadron Structure (RSAF Quality Management, 1998)
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For the Quality Control Flight to fulfill its responsibility, it is required to perform certain
inspections some of which are random inspections and some are planned in coordination with
each flight or section. Table 4 shows the number of required inspections in the second half of
2021 and how many were achieved.
Table 4. Required vs. Achieved Baseline Inspections

Although the facilities and tools to perform these inspections are available, for example,
management, computers, office spaces and transportation, the quality control flight is struggling
to achieve its minimum requirement (75%). This minimum requirement is just an indicator that
shows whether quality control is putting in enough effort to match the amount of maintenance
work performed or not, and in this case, it is not. Since 2009, QC never fell this short of the
baseline and as can be seen in Figure 23; it appears to be something that has been accumulating
overtime which causes this down slope.
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Figure 21. Baseline Percentage per Year

To understand the issues that QCF is struggling with from a worker point of view, a
quick overview of survey results by the Logistic Performance and Evaluation Squadron showed
that outside intervention with QC decisions accounted for 40% of the issues, as shown in Figure
24, A new issue came to light which was not expected – manpower. It seems like manpower is
now a strong driver behind the issue (33%). Workload (11%), training (8%), and supporting
tools (8%) are also contributing factors.
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Figure 22. QC Issues Restricting Performance (RSAF Safety Directorate, 2019)

Outside Interventions
When an individual is a quality inspector and has made the right decision that might
affect the running of operations in the maintenance squadron, the individual should be
commended for the work that may have spared the squadron heavy losses. However, apparently
that is not the case; the odds are that the individual will be called to the MSC’s office or the
Maintenance Operations Control Flight (MOCF) and ordered to reverse their decision. In a
military environment, no is not an answer.
Current QCF Manpower Status
According to RSAF Instruction 4-7166-1-3-1, only those technicians who have spent 5
years working in their Air Force Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) after they have finished their
training will qualify to be selected as a QC inspector. However, their assignment to QC is not
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permanent and it is under the MSC discretion to move them again as he/she sees appropriate.
There are currently 39 workers (inspectors, support staff, and admin) assigned to QCF, which is
almost half the number it was last year. The reason that the number dropped is because 30
inspectors were assigned back to their original sections and given an additional duty as a QC
point of contact. However, the authorized manpower for QCF is based on the number of aircraft
in the squadron, and in the case of the KKAB F-15 maintenance squadron, the Unit Manning
Document states that the authorized manning for QCF is 94.
F-15 Maintenance Culture
In the survey, it was discovered that 66% of QC personnel prefer to go back to work at
their previous sections (their original AFSCs). When queried further using the “Five Whys”
technique, they feel their job is harder than their previous job and they are not being appreciated
or compensated for that. Another reason is that they feel outcasted by the maintenance
community and looked at as a source of problems.
When a QC inspector decides to write-up a technician for some unsafe act or unlawful
maintenance procedure, it is almost guaranteed that the MSC will step in and overrule the
inspector’s decision. The MSC is not violating any rules here, he/she is just practicing his/her
lawful authority. Most MSCs have an operationally oriented way of looking at their squadrons.
Their primary aim is to not miss a scheduled flight to prevent the readiness status from dropping
below the lower control with little to no considerations to quality. All these reasons do not
justify the decline in the level of quality, but it is a good starting point for understanding how we
reached this level and how we can recover and avoid this in the future.
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Training
Newly assigned technicians to QC must start with Cross-Utilization Training (CUT),
which is a type of training that qualifies a person to accomplish a task unassisted outside of their
specialty but within a related field. According to RSAF Instruction 4-7166-1-3-1, CUT should
be accomplished within 180 days of the assignment to QC. The survey shows only 1 out of 7
technicians who were recently assigned to QC have completed their CUT in time. There are
several courses to augment in-house training. Course availability, content, length, location, and
schedule should be known by MTC. The capability of QC personnel can be improved by
scheduling them for the available quality training courses during their period of assignment to
QC.
Future State
The goal is to design a quality program that ensures the following:
1. Maintenance tasks are performed in accordance with quality control standards.
2. No outside interventions/influence can happen.
3. Guarantees the smooth flow of the quality control processes.
4. Restores customer satisfaction.
The level of quality should be expected to increase within aircraft maintenance squadrons which
can only lead to better performance, safer work environments, fewer maintenance-related
accidents, fewer human errors, and higher aircraft readiness. The benefits of designing such a
process will not just be for the maintenance squadrons but for the entire Royal Saudi Air Force
and the country.
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